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Abstract
The optimal price of each firm falls in the search cost of consumers, in the
limit to the monopoly price, despite the exit of lower-value consumers in response
to costlier search. Exit means that fewer inframarginal consumers remain. The
decrease in marginal buyers is smaller, because part of demand is composed of
customers coming from rival firms. These buyers can be held up and are not
marginal. Higher search cost reduces the fraction of incoming switchers among
buyers, which decreases the hold-up motive, thus the price.
Keywords: Search cost, hold-up, imperfect information, price competition.
JEL classification: D82, C72, D43.
Industry associations often provide a public member directory1 that reduces cus-
tomers’ search costs and informs them about the value provided by each firm, but does
not reveal prices. This suggests that firms in the industry benefit from cheaper search
by enough to justify maintaining and updating the searchable directory on the web.
Easier comparison of firms seemingly increases competition and reduces profits—an
intuition confirmed by most industrial organisation models. By contrast, this paper
∗Research School of Economics, Australian National University, 25a Kingsley St, Acton ACT 2601,
Australia. Email: sander.heinsalu@anu.edu.au, website: https://sanderheinsalu.com/ The author
thanks the audience at the MIT theory lunch for comments and suggestions. The hospitality of MIT
during part of this work is greatly appreciated.
1 Grocers: http://www.agbr.com/store-locator/, notaries: https://www.
thenotariessociety.org.uk/notary-search, restoration contractors: https://www.iicrc.
org/page/IICRCGlobalLocator.
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shows how differentiated firms can in fact increase profits by reducing search costs and
making the surplus offered more comparable across firms.
The economic forces can be elucidated in a simple model of a duopoly in price com-
petition. Firms simultaneously set prices. Consumers privately know their valuations
for both firms, which may be determined by geographic location or the preferred times
for a service. Initially, each consumer is familiar with one of the firms, in the sense of
observing its price. Consumers may buy immediately from their ‘home’ firm, exit, or
learn the price of the competitor. After learning, consumers may buy from either firm
or exit. Firms cannot distinguish customers who buy immediately from those who first
learn and then decide.2
The consumers who learn can be held up, because their willingness to pay the search
cost implies that their valuation for the firm they arrive at is above its equilibrium
price. The hold-up motive increases prices. Greater search cost weakens the hold-up
motive, because fewer consumers search. When a smaller fraction of a firm’s demand
is composed of customers switching from the competitor, the hold-up motive and price
are lower.
Another intuition is that higher search costs cause some consumers to exit who pre-
viously would have switched firms. More exit leaves fewer inframarginal consumers to
firms on average, so some firm’s inframarginal demand falls. If the firms are symmetric
enough, then each of them receives fewer inframarginal buyers. The number of marginal
consumers may rise or fall in the search cost, but this change is smaller. As the ratio of
inframarginal to marginal consumers falls, so does the optimal price. The prices of the
firms are strategic complements, so one firm’s price cut motivates others to follow suit.
The literature on search costs and pricing is large and mostly finds that prices
increase in the search cost, as in the seminal work of Diamond (1971). Exceptions
assume either multiproduct or multiperiod markets or add a countervailing force (higher
switching cost or firm obfuscation) to a lower search cost. The current work presents a
simpler one-shot, one-product framework, with a different driving force (reduced hold-
up) and a stronger result—prices strictly decrease in the search cost for any positive
search cost at which some consumers still switch firms.
2 Websites try to track buyers’ browsing history to segment them into switchers and captive cus-
tomers, but buyers may take countermeasures (using a VPN, the Tor browser, or searching on different
devices). The segmentation may be illegal or create negative publicity, making it not worthwhile.
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In Zhou (2014), multiproduct search makes products complements: a price cut on
one increases demand for both, more so at a greater search cost. Thus prices may fall
in the search cost. Rhodes and Zhou (2019) extend this result to four firms who supply
two products and may merge pairwise into two-product firms. Higher search cost may
cause mergers, which may reduce prices due to the complementarity mechanism of Zhou
(2014).
Klemperer (1987, 1995) points out that if consumers have a switching cost after
their first purchase, but not initially, then higher switching costs may reduce prices even
below cost in the first period. The reason is that firms compete to lock in customers
to later charge the monopoly price. The second-period prices weakly increase in the
switching cost.
Dube´ et al. (2009) show numerically and Cabral (2009) analytically that intermedi-
ate switching cost leads to lower prices than zero switching cost in an infinite horizon
model. The incentive to cut price to ‘invest’ in customer acquisition outweighs the in-
centive to ‘harvest’ with a high price. However, for large enough switching costs, prices
rise. Cabral (2016) extends these results to show that if trades have high frequency or
the market structure is close to symmetric duopoly, then switching costs increase com-
petition, but with infrequent trade or sufficiently asymmetric competitors, switching
costs decrease competition.
Lal and Sarvary (1999) model adding a web shop to a physical store. They assume
that the web shop reduces search costs but increases switching costs, because it is easy
to re-order a familiar brand. This may raise prices and reduce search, driven by the
higher switching cost, which outweighs the lower search cost.
In Ellison and Wolitzky (2012), firms obfuscate to increase consumers’ search cost.
With costless obfuscation, firms exactly offset a fall in the exogenous search cost, so it
does not affect prices. Thus it may be said that prices weakly increase in the search
cost.
The next section introduces the framework and derives the main result. Extensions
and generalisations are discussed in Section 3, followed by the conclusion in Section 4.
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1 Horizontally differentiated duopoly
Two firms i ∈ {X, Y } simultaneously set prices Pi. There is a mass 1 of consumers
indexed by v = (vX , vY ), where vi ∈ [0, 1] is the consumer’s valuation for firm i’s
product. Consumers privately know their valuations. Firms only have the common
prior belief that vi is distributed according to the pdf fi, which is positive with interval
support. The corresponding cdf is denoted Fi.
Independently of v, fraction µX of consumers initially observe PX , and fraction
µY = 1 − µX observe PY . Call the firm whose price a consumer initially observes the
initial firm of the consumer.
Each consumer decides whether to buy from her initial firm, learn the price of the
other firm at cost s > 03 or exit. After learning, the consumer decides whether to buy
from firm X, firm Y or exit.
The payoff from not buying is normalised to zero. A consumer with valuation v
who buys from firm i at price Pi without searching obtains payoff vi − Pi, but after
search, obtains vi−Pi− s if buys and −s if exits. Firm i that sets price Pi resulting in
ex post demand Di gets ex post profit pii := (Pi − ci)Di, with ci < 1. W.l.o.g. restrict
Pi ∈ [ci, 1], because pricing below cost or above the maximal valuation of consumers is
never a unique best response. A mixed strategy of firm i is the cdf σi on [ci, 1].
Equilibrium consists of firms’ pricing strategies and consumer decisions such that
(i) each firm maximises profits given the decisions it expects of the consumers and the
rival firm, (ii) consumers choose to buy, learn or exit based on the prices they see and
expect, and if they learn, then choose based on the prices they see which firm, if any,
to buy from to maximise their expected payoff and (iii) the expectations of the firms
and consumers are correct.
The next section first finds the optimal decisions of consumers, which determine the
demands for the firms. Then the profit-maximising prices are calculated, followed the
main comparative static of prices decreasing in the search cost.
3 Zero search cost is qualitatively different (Bertrand competition). Section 3 discusses s = 0.
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2 Demand, profit and comparative statics
To solve the pricing game, start with the decisions of the consumers. These determine
the demands for the firms, which are then used to find the optimal prices.
Consumer v who observes firm j’s price Pj and expects firm i to choose the pricing
strategy σEi learns Pi if∫ 1
ci
max
{
0, vi − P Ei , vj − Pj
}
dσEi (P
E
i )− s ≥ max {0, vj − Pj} . (1)
The right-hand side (RHS) of (1) is the value of not learning—either choosing to exit
(payoff zero) or to buy immediately at price Pj. The left-hand side (LHS) is the
benefit of learning minus the search cost s. The benefit (the integral) reflects the
options of being able to exit, buy from firm i or buy from firm j after learning. The
consumer chooses the best of these options, thus the max, and before learning, forms
an expectation of the best of these options based on the pricing strategy of firm i
(integrates over P Ei with respect to σ
E
i ).
The certainty equivalent price
PiCE =
∫ vi−max{0,vj−Pj}
ci
P Ei dσ
E
i (P
E
i ) (2)
for the learning decision of a consumer who faces Pj and expects σ
E
i is the pure
price of firm i that creates the same benefit of learning as σEi . Formally, PiCE solves
max {vi − PiCE, 0, vj − Pj} =
∫ 1
ci
max
{
vi − P Ei , 0, vj − Pj
}
dσEi (P
E
i ). If σ
E
i is the pure
P ∗i , then of course PiCE = P
∗. The interpretation of (2) is that a consumer cares about
firm i’s expected price conditional on accepting it. The consumer accepts it if it is
below the consumer’s value vi for firm i by at least the net benefit (value minus price)
of buying from j.
The demand for a firm consists of consumers initially at that firm who either buy
immediately or learn and then buy from that firm, and consumers initially at the rival
firm who learn and switch. Figure 1 depicts demands for each firm from customers
initially at each firm (left panel: buyers initially at firm X, right panel: Y ). The
marginal customers for firm Y are marked as the thick blue line and the marginal
buyers for X as the thick orange line.
The valuations of customers initially at i who eventually buy from i either motivate
them to buy immediately (when vi − Pi ≥ max {0, vj − PjCE − s}) or make it optimal
5
Figure 1: Demands at the pure prices PX = P
∗
X = PXCE = 0.6 and PY = P
∗
Y = PY CE =
0.45 and search cost s = 0.1. Left panel: consumers initially at firm X, right panel: Y .
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to learn and then still buy from i (when vj −PjCE − s ≥ max {0, vi − Pi} and vi−Pi ≥
max {0, vj − Pj}). These conditions combine to vi ≥ Pi+max {0, vj −max {PjCE + s, Pj}}.
Consumers starting at j buy from i if their expected benefit from learning and
the observed benefit from i after learning are large enough. Formally, vi − PiCE −
s ≥ max {0, vj − Pj} and vi − Pi ≥ max {0, vj − Pj}, which are equivalent to vi ≥
max {Pi, PiCE + s}+ max {0, vj − Pj}.
The demand that firm i expects from price Pi when it expects firm j to choose
pricing strategy σ∗j and consumers initially at j (i) to expect σ
E
i (σ
E
j ) is
Di(Pi, σ
∗
j , σ
E
i , σ
E
j ) = µi
∫ 1
cj
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
Pi+max{0,vj−max{PjCE+s,P ∗j }}
fi(vi)fj(vj)dvidvjdσ
∗
j (P
∗
j )
+ µj
∫ 1
cj
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
max{Pi,PiCE+s}+max{0,vj−P ∗j }
fi(vi)fj(vj)dvidvjdσ
∗
j (P
∗
j ). (3)
The inner two integrals in the demand aggregate the consumers initially at each firm
over the region of valuations that result in these consumers eventually buying from i,
given the prices. The outer integral in (3) reflects firm i’s expectation over the prices
of firm j.
Having derived the demand for each firm, the next preliminary lemma establishes
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pure best responses of the firms and the strategic complementarity of prices. A sufficient
condition is that the densities of consumer valuations do not decrease too fast, which
is satisfied by the uniform distribution and many others. The formal condition bounds
below the elasticity of the pdf of valuations.
Lemma 1. If (Pi − ci)∂fi(Pi+w)∂Pi ≥ −fi(Pi + w) for all w ∈ [0, 1] for each firm i, then
each has a pure best response to any σ∗j , σ
E
i , σ
E
j , and prices are strategic complements.
Proof of Lemma 1. Using (3), firm i’s profit has the derivative
∂pii(Pi, σ
∗
j , σ
E
i , σ
E
j )
∂Pi
=
∫ 1
cj
∫ 1
0
[
1− µiFi
(
Pi + max
{
0, vj −max
{
PjCE + s, P
∗
j
}})
(4)
− µjFi
(
max {Pi, PiCE + s}+ max
{
0, vj − P ∗j
})
− (Pi − ci)µifi
(
Pi + max
{
0, vj −max
{
PjCE + s, P
∗
j
}})
−(Pi − ci)µj1{Pi>PiCE+s}fi
(
Pi + max
{
0, vj − P ∗j
})]
dFj(vj)dσ
∗
j (P
∗
j ).
and the second derivative
∂2pii
∂P 2i
= −
∫ 1
cj
∫ 1
0
[
2µifi
(
Pi + max
{
0, vj −max
{
PjCE + s, P
∗
j
}})
(5)
+ 2µj1{Pi>PiCE+s}fi
(
Pi + max
{
0, vj − P ∗j
})
+ (Pi − ci)µi
∂fi
(
Pi + max
{
0, vj −max
{
PjCE + s, P
∗
j
}})
∂Pi
+(Pi − ci)µj1{Pi>PiCE+s}
∂fi
(
Pi + max
{
0, vj − P ∗j
})
∂Pi
]
dFj(vj)dσ
∗
j (P
∗
j ).
Sufficient for ∂
2pii
∂P 2i
< 0 ∀Pi ∈ (ci, 1) is
∫ 1
0
[(Pi − ci)∂fi(Pi+w)∂Pi + 2fi(Pi +w)]dFj(vj) ≥ 0 for
all w ∈ [0, 1], which is ensured if (Pi− ci)∂fi(Pi+w)∂Pi ≥ −2fi(Pi +w) for all w ∈ [0, 1− cj].
Therefore the best response (BR) of firm i to any σ∗j , σ
E
i , σ
E
j is pure and unique.
Focus on pure strategies from now on, so PjCE = Pj. By Milgrom and Roberts
(1990) Theorem 4, the game is supermodular if ∂
2pii
∂Pi∂Pj
≥ 0, in which case prices are
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strategic complements. The cross-partial derivative is
∂2pii
∂Pi∂Pj
=
∫ 1
P ∗j +s
µifi
(
Pi + vj − P ∗j − s
)
dFj(vj) (6)
+
∫ 1
P ∗j
µjfi
(
max {Pi, PiCE + s}+ vj − P ∗j
)
dFj(vj)
+
∫ 1
P ∗j +s
(Pi − ci)µi
∂fi
(
Pi + vj − P ∗j − s
)
∂Pi
dFj(vj)
+
∫ 1
P ∗j
(Pi − ci)µj1{Pi>PiCE+s}
∂fi
(
Pi + vj − P ∗j
)
∂Pi
dFj(vj)
because ∂fi
∂Pj
= − ∂fi
∂Pi
. Sufficient for ∂
2pii
∂P 2i
< 0 < ∂
2pii
∂Pi∂Pj
is
∫ 1
0
[(Pi − ci)∂fi(Pi+w)∂Pi + fi(Pi +
w)]dFj(vj) ≥ 0 for all w ∈ [0, 1], which is ensured if (Pi− ci)∂fi(Pi+w)∂Pi ≥ −fi(Pi +w) for
all w ∈ [0, 1− cj].
Given Lemma 1, pure strategies are assumed from now on. The conditions in the
lemma are far from necessary for pure equilibria—a unique pure best response to any
strategy of the competitor is clearly much stronger than needed. Similarly, prices are
strategic complements under weaker conditions, but these are more complicated.
With strategic complementarities, the prices of the firms move together, the equilib-
ria with the lowest and highest prices are stable, and all stable equilibria have the same
comparative statics. A firm’s profit increases in a rival’s price, so firms impose positive
externalities on each other by raising price. This implies that equilibria are Pareto
ordered by price. The highest-price equilibrium is the natural focus of coordination if
multiple equilibria exist.
The next lemma shows that equilibrium is unique if, in addition to a weaker condi-
tion than in Lemma 1, the consumer valuation pdf is weakly decreasing (e.g., uniform)
and consumers are initially evenly distributed among firms. Firms may be asymmetric
in other respects, e.g., in costs and how much consumers value their product.
Lemma 2. If µj = µi and for each firm,
∂fi(Pi)
∂Pi
≤ 0 and (Pi − ci)∂fi(Pi)∂Pi ≥ −2fi(Pi),
then the equilibrium is unique.
Proof of Lemma 2. Profit after imposing the equilibrium condition Pi = PiCE = P
∗
i on
both firms is denoted pi∗i . Sufficient for a unique equilibrium is that the slopes of best
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responses are below 1. Formally,
∣∣∣− ∂2pi∗i∂Pi∂Pj /∂2pi∗i∂P 2i ∣∣∣ < 1 for each firm i. Equivalently,
∂2pi∗i
∂Pi∂Pj
+
∂2pi∗i
∂P 2i
< 0.
The derivatives of pi∗i are obtained from (5) and (6) by substituting 1{Pi>PiCE+s} = 0
and max
{
PjCE + s, P
∗
j
}
= Pj + s. Then
∂2pi∗i
∂Pi∂Pj
+
∂2pi∗i
∂P 2i
= µi
∫ 1
Pj
fi(Pi + vj − Pj − s)dFj(vj) + µj
∫ 1
Pj
fi(Pi + vj − Pj + s)dFj(vj)
+ µi(Pi − ci)
∫ 1
Pj
∂fi(Pi + vj − Pj − s)
∂Pi
dFj(vj)− 2µi
∫ 1
0
fi (Pi + max {0, vj − Pj − s}) dFj(vj)
− µi(Pi − ci)
∫ 1
0
∂fi (Pi + max {0, vj − Pj − s})
∂Pi
dFj(vj)
= −µi
[
2fi(Pi − s) + (Pi − ci)∂fi(Pi − s)
∂Pi
]
Fj(Pj)
+
∫ 1
Pj
[µjfi(Pi + vj − Pj + s)− µifi (Pi + vj − Pj − s)]dFj(vj)
Sufficient for uniqueness is (Pi − ci)∂fi(Pi)∂Pi ≥ −2fi(Pi) and µj = µi and f ′i ≤ 0.
The main result establishes that if the firms have similar initial demands and the
consumer valuation distribution does not vary too fast, then each firm’s price decreases
in the search cost of the consumers. Uniform valuations satisfy the condition, as does
a truncated exponential distribution if search is not too costly.
Theorem 3. If µifi (Pi − s+ w) + µi(Pi − ci)∂fi(Pi−s+w)∂Pi ≤ µjfi (Pi + s+ w) for all
w ∈ [0, 1− s] and firms set pure prices which are strategic complements, then dP ∗i
ds
≤ 0
for both firms in any stable equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 3. With pure prices, the FOC of firm i in (4) after imposing the
equilibrium condition Pi = PiCE = P
∗
i for each firm is
FOC∗i =
∫ 1
0
[1− µiFi (Pi + max {0, vj − Pj − s}) (7)
− µjFi (Pi + s+ max {0, vj − Pj}) −(Pi − ci)µifi (Pi + max {0, vj − Pj − s})] dFj(vj).
Its derivative w.r.t. s is
∂FOC∗i
∂s
= µi
∫ 1
Pj+s
[
fi (Pi + vj − Pj − s) + (Pi − ci)∂fi (Pi + vj − Pj − s)
∂Pi
]
dFj(vj)
− µj
∫ 1
0
fi (Pi + s+ max {0, vj − Pj}) dFj(vj), (8)
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negative if µifi (Pi − s+ w)+µi(Pi−ci)∂fi(Pi−s+w)∂Pi ≤ µjfi (Pi + s+ w) for all w ∈ [0, 1−
s]. For specific distributions, (8) can be calculated explicitly. Sufficient for
∂FOC∗i
∂s
< 0
is that fi is uniform and µi(1 − Pj − s) ≤ µj(1 − Pj) (with uniform distributions,
Pj ≥ 12√2 for any s > 0 and cj ≥ 0), or fi is truncated exponential and µi(1 − Pi +
ci) exp (−Pi − 1 + Pj + s) ≤ µj exp (−Pi − 1 + Pj − s).
By the Implicit Function Theorem,
∂P ∗i
∂s
= −∂FOC∗i
∂s
/
∂FOC∗i
∂Pi
. Sufficient for the main
result
dP ∗i
ds
< 0 is
∂FOC∗i
∂s
< 0, because the SOC implies
∂FOC∗i
∂Pi
< 0 and prices are
strategic complements by Lemma 1.
The intuition for the main result is that the fraction of switchers among a firm’s
customers falls in the search cost. The switchers can be held up, because they are
willing to pay the price plus the search cost, thus will all still buy if the firm’s chosen
price exceeds the expected price by less than the search cost. The hold-up motive
increases a firm’s optimal price. Greater search cost decreases the hold-up motive,
thus the price. When the search cost becomes so large that no consumers switch, each
firm’s price falls to its monopoly level. The monopoly price is with respect to the
remaining demand at the large search cost when low-valuation customers have exited.
This demand is smaller than at lower search cost and contains relatively more high-
valuation customers. Therefore the monopoly price at the remaining demand is greater
than for a joint owner of the firms at a smaller search cost.
Figure 2 shows the effect of a greater search cost on the demands, fixing the prices.
In the left panel (consumers initially at firm X), the light blue rectangle denotes the
consumers who stop buying from Y and exit when s increases. The bluish diagonal
band below the orange line are consumers who start buying from X instead of Y . In the
right panel, the orange rectangle consists of consumers who stop buying from X and
exit, while the orange diagonal band below the blue line depicts those who stay with
Y instead of switching to X. Each firm loses some switchers who could be held up and
gains some demand from consumers initially at itself who respond to price increases.
This concludes the discussion of how the search cost affects prices. The following
subsection examines the change of profits, welfare and consumer surplus in the search
cost, as well as how prices respond to production costs and initial demands.
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Figure 2: Demands after an increase in the search cost from 0.1 to 0.2 at PX = 0.6,
PY = 0.45.
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2.1 Other comparative statics
Exit increases in the search cost, so total trading surplus in the market falls. Costlier
search also makes the final allocation of buyers to firms less efficient (ideally, consumers
above the diagonal would buy from firm Y and below the diagonal from X). Therefore
welfare and profits decrease in the search cost. The effect on consumer surplus could
have either sign, because both prices and allocative efficiency decrease.
The comparative statics in production costs ci are intuitive: higher costs raise prices.
The FOC (4) increases in ci, so by Milgrom and Roberts (1990) Theorem 6, Pi increases
in ci. Strategic complementarities then imply that all prices rise in any firm’s cost.
The effect of greater asymmetry of initial demands (higher |µX − µY |) on prices is
ambiguous, because the best response curves of the firms move in opposite directions
when µX − µY increases. Each firm’s best response curve may in general rise or fall in
the amount of asymmetry. Strategic complementarities mean that both best responses
are increasing in the rival firm’s price. The intersection of two increasing functions may
move in any direction when one function pointwise increases and the other decreases.
When the firms are symmetric, the best response of firm i decreases in µi − µj, which
rules out a simultaneous increase in Pi and decrease in Pj. The prices may jointly
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increase or decrease, or a fall in Pi may co-occur with an increase in Pj.
Suppose the initial demands are maximally asymmetric—all consumers are initially
at one firm (the incumbent). Then the unique equilibrium prices are such that the
incumbent remains a monopolist. The consumers expect a high enough price from the
other firm (the entrant) that learning is not optimal. Any price cut by the entrant is
not observed by consumers, so they cannot start learning in response to it. Suppose
consumers expected the entrant to set a low enough price to make learning worthwhile
at some valuations. Then the entrant would hold up all arriving switchers by choosing
a price greater than they expected, for any expected price and any positive search cost.
This contradicts consumers learning the entrant’s price.
Modifications of the baseline model are considered next. The results remain ro-
bust to a distribution of search costs, unattached consumers or many firms, and are
continuous in the correlation of valuations.
3 Extensions and generalisations
A distribution of search costs bounded away from zero and independent of the valuations
yields the same results as the mean search cost, because consumers are risk neutral.
With unchanged consumer decisions, the profit-maximising prices remain the same.
The comparative statics use the mean of the search cost distribution and are otherwise
unchanged.
If some consumers have zero search cost and some positive, then firms mix over an
interval of prices. Firms want to undercut each other to attract zero-cost buyers, but if
prices are cut low enough, then prefer to charge a high price and sell just to their initial
positive-cost customers. The hold-up motive is still present, due to the positive-cost
buyers, and decreases in the search cost, so the direction of the comparative statics
remains the same.
With zero search cost for all buyers, prices are discretely lower than with a small
positive search cost, because the mass of inframarginal consumers is continuous in s
even at s = 0, but the mass of marginal consumers approximately doubles at s = 0
compared to a small positive s. Hold-up is impossible if consumers can costlessly switch
firms. The discontinuity in prices at zero search cost is similar to the Diamond paradox.
If some customers are initially at neither firm and have to pay the search cost no
12
matter which one they go to, then the hold-up motive is strengthened for both firms.
The price decrease in the search cost becomes larger.
Correlated valuations of consumers may change the results, depending on the joint
distribution of the valuations. The only modification in the proofs is replacing Fi in
all formulas by Fi|j(·|vj). These modified sufficient conditions may be harder or easier
to satisfy than the original assumptions, depending on the joint distribution of the
valuations. If vX and vY are perfectly positively correlated, then the model with s = 0
is Bertrand competition, and with s > 0, the original Diamond (1971) paradox, where
prices stay constant in s.
Perfect negative correlation of vX and vY reduces the environment with s = 0 to
the Hotelling model. With s > 0 and vY = 1 − vX , firm i’s FOC is µi√2(Pj∗ + s −
Pi) +
µj√
2
(P ∗j − P ∗i − s) − (Pi − ci)
[
µi√
2
+
µj√
2
1 {Pi > P ∗i + s}
]
= 0. Equilibrium prices
are Pi =
µj(µi−µj)s+(1+µj)µici+µjcj
(1+µi)(1+µj)−1 . The marginal consumers are independent of s as long
as Pi < P
∗
i + s. The inframarginal buyers change by
µi−µj√
2
when s increases by a unit.
Firms with symmetric initial demands thus charge the same prices for any s > 0. A
firm with more initial customers raises its price in s, but the smaller firm decreases
(and faster). With equal costs ci = cj, the demand-weighted average price µiPi + µjPj
stays constant in s.
Consumers uniformly distributed on a + symbol in the demand squares result in
both firms charging a constant price for all s ≥ 0. Thus each firm’s competitive and
monopoly price are equal. The price of firm Y is equal to the distance from the x-axis
to the centre of the +, and symmetrically for firm X. An example of such a distribution
is two crossing streets with consumers living along their length.
Many firms are conceptually similar to duopoly—in each firm’s FOC, replace the
rival firm with the combination of all rivals. The incentives of firm i are the same as
when facing a single competitor which has initial demand
∑
j 6=i µj and offers consumers
the net value maxj 6=i
{
vj − P ∗j
}
distributed according to
∏
j 6=i Fj(·+ P ∗j ). Equilibrium
prices in an oligopoly are of course lower than in a duopoly in which all rivals are
controlled by a single owner. However, the comparative statics retain their direction,
because the FOC of each firm still decreases in s for a range of parameters.
If consumers initially at firm i do not know their valuation vj for the rival firm, but
can learn vj and Pj together, then valuation distributions close to uniform result in in-
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tuitive comparative statics—prices increase in the search cost.4 However, for symmetric
firms, a sufficiently large decrease in the valuation pdf at a point v∗ above the monopoly
price implies that prices decrease in the search cost over some range of s. A numerical
example has µi =
1
2
, ci = 0 and fi(vi) =
32 if vi ∈ [0, 12 ],1
2
if vi ∈ (12 , 1],
for both firms. Thus v∗ = 1
2
.
The equilibrium prices at s = 0 are approximately 0.31, and the monopoly price as s
becomes large is 0.25. As s increases from 0.13 to 0.19, prices decrease linearly from
0.491 to 0.384.
At large s, the environments with known and unknown valuation for the other firm
are identical because no consumers switch. At s = 0, these models are also identical,
because it is weakly dominant for all consumers to search. If consumers know their
valuations, then prices jump up when the search cost becomes positive, but if the
valuation for the other firm is unknown, then prices are continuous at costless search.
Thus for low positive search costs, consumers obtain greater utility when they do not
know their valuation. Firms correspondingly make lower profits.
The following section concludes with a discussion of the predictions and policy
implications from the main model.
4 Discussion
When prices and profits decrease in the search cost, industry associations naturally want
to provide information that helps customers compare members. An online directory
achieves this, which justifies the cost of creating and maintaining the member database.
Notably, such searchable directories do not provide price comparisons, even though
these would be easy to add. A simple explanation why not is that reducing the search
cost to zero by making prices transparent would discretely decrease prices and profits
relative to a small positive cost.
At low positive search costs, prices and profits are discretely higher when consumers
know their valuation for each firm before the learning decision than when they learn
the valuation together with the price. This is an additional motive for industry groups
to inform consumers in detail about the goods and services each member provides.
4If fi = 1, ci = 0 and µi =
1
2 , then the monopoly prices at large s are Pi =
1
2 and the competitive
prices at s = 0 are Pi ≈ 0.414.
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For a large enough search cost, each firm is a monopolist over its initial customers,
which would be a reason for high prices, especially when the exit of low-valuation buyers
increases the average willingness to pay among the remaining ones. However, the exit
of many consumers (who are inefficiently allocated to a firm which they value little)
reduces total surplus enough to outweigh the larger share of surplus that a monopolist
can obtain using its market power. Therefore firms prefer a more efficient allocation
even if it means more competition.
As Adam Smith already noted, industry associations tend to collude to increase the
profits of their members at the expense of consumers. A regulator maximising consumer
surplus prefers either zero search cost, or if this is unattainable, then maximal cost.
Prohibiting information release by an association is difficult, so the regulator should
instead provide price comparisons directly. Examples are a government-run health
insurance exchange and a government website listing pension funds ordered by their
total fee loading. Of course, the industry can counter by obfuscating prices with hidden
add-on costs and private discounts.
A regulator maximising total surplus unambiguously prefers a lower search cost. At
small positive search costs, both kinds of regulator prefer that consumers do not know
their valuation for the rival firm. However, providing price information to consumers
dominates removing their valuation information even if the latter was possible.
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